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I. Introduction
In Disclosure V. Anonymity in Campaign Finance, Ian Ayres broaches a very particular
issue in the design of democratic institutions, discusses that issue in a very particular
context, and advocates a very particular institutional remedy.   The specific issue concerns
the regulation of information concerning political donations. The specific context has two
relevant dimensions.  Ayres is clearly concerned with the case of the US, and, implicitly
and explicitly, the discussion takes many other aspects of the US political environment as
the relevant background. At the same time, Ayres is primarily concerned with the
prevention of corruption, so that the relevant criterion by which alternative institutional
regimes are judged is just the extent to which corruption is deterred. Within this context,
Ayres argues that the norm of full anonymity in respect of political donations would
operate more effectively to prevent corruption than would the norm of full disclosure; so
that rather than ‘sunlight [being] the best of disinfectants; electric light the most efficient
policeman’, Ayres argues that total darkness is the real cure for corruption. Ayres’s
constructed ‘veil of ignorance’ is nothing like Rawls’s, but it does involve a putatively
constructive use of ignorance in the same way that Rawls’s construction does.
The essential argument is simple enough. Under full information, all campaign donations
are matters of public record, so that there can be nothing covert about the funding process;
nevertheless, the possibility of buying political favours is still present. Indeed, in the limit,
one might imagine that competitive political donations constitute a straightforward market
for political influence that operates alongside the electoral process to determine political
outcomes. Whether or not we describe open financial transactions in such a market as
‘corrupt’1, or ‘unfair’ (given an unequal distribution of income and wealth), there is
certainly a presumption that such a ‘market’ might be expected to influence political
outcomes and so reduce the reliance of political outcomes on the electoral process and
other more strictly ‘political’  mechanisms. At the other extreme, under perfect
anonymity, campaign donations are organised in such a way that no one (other than the
donor - and specifically not the recipient)  has any reliable information about the existence,
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or size, of any individual donation. In this case, so the argument goes, since there can be no
proof that a donation has been made, there can be no political deals struck: it is impossible
to buy influence if it is impossible to demonstrate payment.  
Of course, this sketch does not do full justice to Ayres’s argument, but we believe that it
suffices to focus attention on the key issues: the idea that corruption takes the form of
market-like deals that ‘pervert’ the democratic process in the sense that political outcomes
differ from those that would be realised under purely political process; and the argument
that such deals are effectively ruled out by complete anonymity. We also note that
Ayres’s discussion is informed by a recurring analogy with the process of voting itself -
and with the idea, in particular, that the secret or ‘Australian’ ballot provides an
appropriate exemplar for secrecy in the political process. We will return to the significance
of this analogical reasoning, and to other aspects of Ayres’s specific argument, in due
course  but first we wish to make some effort to widen the discussion a little.   
The design of democratic institutions may be approached in either of two styles - a
‘piecemeal’ style or a ‘synoptic’ one. A piecemeal style characteristically focuses on this
or that piece of institutional practice and subjects it to scrutiny. A synoptic style is one
that attempts to work from general principles in developing an overview of the operation
of democratic institutions and to develop thereby implications for the design of particular
institutional devices2. Clearly, neither style holds a monopoly on usefulness, and it is
likely that the iteration between these styles offers the most plausible route to reasonable
conclusions. It is for this reason that, initially at least, we wish to respond to Ayres’s
piecemeal proposal in a rather more synoptic mode.
Even if we narrow our range of concern to the institutional framework for financing
democratic politics, we must recognise that a number of inter-related issues are raised: the
relative merits of private and state funding of political parties or candidates; the possibility
of regulating either the set of agents who may make political contributions, or the size of
the political contributions they may make; the possibility of regulating the flow of
information about the financial affairs of donors, parties or candidates; the possibility of
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regulating expenditures made by parties or candidates; and so on. None of these issues is
trivial either in the sense that the normatively appropriate answer is obvious, or in the
sense that the same practice has developed almost universally across democratic countries.
And matters become still more complicated if we open up the possibility of interactions
between these various issues, or with other aspects of the institutional fabric such as
voting rules,  the structure of representation, and so on.  Indeed, it is not even obvious how
we should go about addressing these matters. Two ingredients seem essential however - a
reasonably clear statement of the model of democratic politics to be used as the test-bed
within which to conduct the relevant thought-experiments, and a reasonably clear
statement of the relevant normative criteria. Unfortunately, neither ingredient is readily
available or widely agreed. The first aim of this brief essay is to say something about the
appropriate ingredients to use in constructing particular arguments concerned with the
funding of democratic politics or, indeed, any other aspect of the design of democratic
institutions. Only then will we return to the specific issue of anonymity in political
donations.
II. Some Basic Ingredients
We have already mentioned two basic ingredients - an appropriate normative criterion and
a benchmark model of democratic political behaviour. We will say a little about each in
turn.
It is clear that political institutions are not, and should not be, judged solely by their ability
to deter or avoid corruption. The central task of political institutions is to play their part
in improving social outcomes. Corruption is certainly one way in which institutions may
fail, but concentrating on one potential failure is unlikely to lead to good overall design.
The point is simple enough and should be familiar as an application of the general theory
of the second best. If there are many criteria that aggregate in some way to indicate the
overall value of a particular set of political institutions, and if one of these criteria is (the
avoidance of) corruption - defined in some specific way - then it will in general be the case
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that the optimal amount of corruption will be non-zero. Furthermore, it cannot be assumed
that a reduction in corruption is necessarily a good thing. 
We will say nothing very specific here about the precise nature of the overall normative
criterion - whether it be some utilitarian social welfare function or some other conception
of the good. The only points that seems important at the synoptic level are: first, that the
normative criterion employed should be broadly consistent with the idea of democracy as
such - so that it should take seriously the idea of serving the interests of the people and
seek to do so via a political system that embodies the idea of government by the people;
and second, that the normative criterion employed should be sensitive to the wide variety
of ways in which the political system impacts on the people so that, as already noted, (the
avoidance of) corruption is seen as just one aspect of the good, which may be traded-off
against other aspects in an overall evaluation.
Although Ayres is not explicit about the underlying model of political behaviour he has in
mind, it seems that his model of politics is a variant of the model associated with ‘rational
actor political theory’. The central emphasis on political deals and on the role of
informational conditions in determining whether (rational) individuals will enter into deals,
is sufficient to make a strong connection with the rational actor model. At the same time,
there are a number of indications that the model in question is not the standard economists’
model in which all agents - whether potential voters, potential candidates or potential
donors - are both rational and motivated by a relatively narrow view of their self-interest.
References to "independent deliberation and reason-giving", and such observations as "At
times, representatives should take positions that are not merely aggregations of their
constituents’ preferences"3 display both a degree of unease with the standard rational actor
model and a tendency toward what we might term a ‘deliberative democracy’ model4. The
simple point that we wish to emphasise is that without some reasonably explicit and
coherent account of the underlying model of political behaviour by candidates, voters and
donors, it is not possible to analyse the impact of alternative institutional arrangements
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satisfactorily. And the analysis that one gets depends quite crucially on the details of the
model employed.
The problem is that the rational actor model and the deliberative democracy model offer
very different diagnoses of the central problems of democratic politics: those models
therefore, point to very different cures5. In the rational actor framework, the central
problems are those of aggregation and agency - how to design an institutional structure that
aggregates interests appropriately and also ensures that political agents are appropriately
constrained to enact the relevant policies. In the deliberative democracy model, the central
problem facing the design of political institutions is the creation of an environment that
encourages reasoned public debate - and this against the background assumption that
individuals are motivated, at least in appropriate institutional settings, to seek out policies
that are in the public interest (in some particular sense of that phrase). Voting may play a
role in deliberative procedures, but that role need not be central. Certainly, the electoral
process will not bear interpretation as a simple aggregation of private interests - though it
may be interpreted along the lines of the Condorcet jury theorems in which voting plays
the role of amplifying the enlightenment of the individual jurors and reducing the
probability of mistakes.
The most fundamental difference between the two models clearly lies in the motivational
structure that they assume of individuals. The standard ‘public choice’ model takes
individuals to be essentially self-interested and construes the political problem as
constructing social choices out of individual values, and then implementing those choices
through individual (self-interested) agents. The deliberative model, by contrast, assumes
more socially or morally motivated individuals, and identifies the political problem as
essentially one of attempting to reach consensus on what a more or less commonly shared
morality requires.
It is appropriate at this point that we say something about our own position on this
issue6. We take as our point of departure the rational actor model, but depart from that
model in several respects. First, and most fundamentally, we believe that the basic desires
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that serve as motivational triggers for rational agents include a desire to act as morality
requires. Our rational agents are open, at least potentially, to moral argument; and moral
reasons will count among their motives for action. But the desire to act as morality requires
is only one desire among many - including the normal range of self-interested desires. In
making our agents open to moral argument we do not wish to make them moral angels. In
this sense, we seek quite explicitly to occupy a position somewhere between the standard
rational actor model and the full model of deliberative democracy.
Our approach has other distinctive features. We take seriously the criticism of
instrumental, self interested voting that gives rise to the ‘paradox of voting’7. The basic
problem here is that self-interested and rational individuals almost never have a private,
instrumental incentive to vote in large-scale elections. Since the probability that their vote
will be decisive is vanishingly small, voting is literally ‘inconsequential’.  An additional,
related problem is that of rational ignorance - the idea that self-interested and rational
individuals will almost never have a private, instrumental incentive to gather information
relative to political decision making, so that any votes they may cast may be expected to
be ill-informed. Our reaction to these problems is to argue that voting in large-scale
political elections is more appropriately conceived as an expressive rather than an
instrumental act. Since voting is inconsequential, rational citizens will take the low-cost
opportunity of expressing their support for this or that party, candidate or position rather
than consulting a private interest calculus.
An important point here is that expressions of support cannot necessarily be assumed to
correlate well with interests.  To re-use an example, in a situation in which the real choice
is between war and a negotiated settlement to a dispute, and on the assumption that a
negotiated settlement is in everyone’s interests, we might still expect some - perhaps even
a majority - to vote for war. All that is required is that (some) individuals sense that their
individual votes are effectively irrelevant, and choose to use their vote to express their
nationalistic pride. Of course, the expression of support might also yield better - that is,
more moral - outcomes than any simple aggregation of interests in some other cases. Our
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point is simply that the logic of the failure of the instrumental account of voting points to
expressive voting which in turn points to a very different understanding of the potential
advantages and disadvantages of the electoral process.
Combining these elements of a more moral motivational structure and an expressive
account of voting, we obtain the bare outline of a model of representative democracy. The
model includes some aspects of the deliberative democracy tradition insofar as it admits
moral argument as a relevant part of the political process, but retains much of the structure
of the rational choice theoretic account of politics. The model offers a basis for
institutional analysis that recognises that political institutions do more than simply
aggregate interests and provide instrumental incentives.  In this sense, our model is broadly
consistent with Ayres’s concerns and style of analysis, though since Ayres’s discussion
leaves his precise conception of the details of agent motivation somewhat shadowy, it
would be misleading to cast our model as the one that Ayres seems to have in mind.
III. The Analogy with the Secret Ballot
An important part of Ayres’s rhetorical force derives from an appeal to the analogy with
the secret ballot.  Specifically, Ayres suggests that the example of the secret ballot
provides an insight into the more general case for secrecy/anonymity as an appropriate
part of political institutions. We are, ourselves, by no means opposed to argument by
analogy, but we think this particular analogy can cut several ways. We are interested in
particular in the question as to how Ayres’s appeal to the authority of the secrecy
property fits with his general picture of politics and the understanding of voting that is
implied.  As we see it, what is at stake here is a tension between the narrow interpretation
of the rational actor model and the more expressive/deliberative model of politics8. As we
have already suggested, the rational actor model views voting as the revelation of
essentially private interests in a process designed to aggregate those interests. It might
seem that the secret ballot is an institutional arrangement well suited to this model since it
allows individuals to reveal their preferences without fear or favour, and may also serve to
moderate any strategic influences that arise from information on the voting behaviour of
Paying for Politics - Brennan & Hamlin
others. Call this the anti-corruption view. This view may be questioned from within the
rational actor model, but let it stand for the moment. How does this fit with Ayres’s
‘deliberative’ picture of politics?  On the face of things, poorly. One would think that any
deliberative model of democracy would be inclined to see voting as an integral part of the
process of deliberation. The very essence of the deliberative idea is that individual citizens
should engage in  public debate, giving  reasons for their political views that are intended to
be influential in the political decision making of their fellow citizens. Similarly, an
important aspect of an expressive account of voting seems to be that voting provides the
opportunity to express opinion in public in a credible manner - to publicly declare
allegiance to some ideal or principle, for example9.  But in this case, the idea of secret
voting seems curiously out of step with the main thrust of the model. Secret voting breaks
the most obvious connection between argument and vote, and undermines the reliability of
the vote as a serious and responsible political input. If individuals are not held responsible
for their vote, at least to the extent of being called to defend their stated opinion, it is
difficult to see how the full discursive ideal is being taken seriously. Any model that tries
to combine rational and deliberative elements will therefore face a trade-off between the
anti-corruption argument for secret ballots and the expressive/deliberative argument for
open and responsible political debate. Neither argument is clearly superior in terms of the
overall normative criterion of improving political outcomes as seen from the perspective of
citizens.  But what does seem clear is that secrecy and discussion  belong in rather different
camps.
 We would suggest that a similar trade-off is present in relation to the institutional
arrangements for campaign financing. Even if the anti-corruption argument taken by itself
points toward secrecy as an appropriate norm, the culture of candour that goes with
disclosure is also an input into to creating a more deliberative and discursive form of
democracy.  In fact, there is a particular wrinkle to the use of secrecy in the campaign
contribution case that gives special force to this observation. Although both the secret
ballot and Ayres’s scheme involve the constructive use of secrecy, only Ayres’s scheme is
parasitic on the prevalence of deception. Ayres’s argument depends on the claim that
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unverifiable statements are worthless, and on its being common knowledge that this is so.
As Ayres conceives it, there are likely to be plenty of claims by those who request
political favours that campaign contributions have been made. But no rational candidate
will believe any such claim: there will be no trust without verification. This is part and
parcel of the traditional economistic approach to rational behaviour. But again we would
suggest that this approach is not well suited to any political environment in which genuine
 trust - that is, acceptance without verification – is supposed to be in play. And such trust
seems  a  necessary feature of many forms of representative democracy  and particularly of
those forms in which discussion as such  is conceived to play a critical role10. 
Suppose, for example, that some potential contributors are trustworthy, and suppose that
trustworthy donors would find it offensive to be treated as untrustworthy. In this setting,
it is easy to see that trustworthy people may refrain from making donations if their claims
to have made donations are not believed. If this is so, there may be good reason for  the
candidates to act as if those who claim to have made contributions are telling the truth -
that is, to trust everyone regardless of verification.  This might well be the overall
contribution-maximising strategy for candidates, at least in the short run. Then Ayres’s
scheme might operate perversely to reward the liars among the putative donors, since they
can now gain political favours at no cost. Of course, in the longer run, Ayres presumption
of universal mistrust may come to be justified as the liars profit and come to dominate. We
will then have established a politics in which truly all men are liars (except where it is
instrumentally rational for them to tell the truth). But the norm of anonymity will have
been instrumental in bringing that state about, whereas a more open norm, designed in
recognition of the possibility of genuine trust, might offer a better prospect of trustworthy
conduct.  
In this sense, there is an important difference between secret voting and campaign
contributor anonymity. The secret ballot depends on, and encourages, a culture of privacy.
Each can respond to questions about voting behaviour with the quip: “It’s none of your
business”. But Ayres’s scheme depends on and encourages a culture of widespread
Paying for Politics - Brennan & Hamlin
mistrust. A candidate’s response to claims of financial support must be “I don’t believe
you”.  One might be prepared to tolerate a demand for privacy (with appropriate
reluctance), without wanting to promote a culture of cynicism.
IV.  Financing Elections
Let us at this point set the matter of analogies aside, and look directly at the question of
campaign contributions and the work - for good or ill - that they do in electoral politics. 
Within the rational actor context, repeated elections play the dual role of identifying the
chosen policy and of disciplining otherwise untrustworthy agents. In the simplest possible
version of the rational actor model - that characterised by the median voter theorem -
electoral competition performs both these roles ‘perfectly’. The logic of the median voter
theorem is that, whatever the motivations of the candidates themselves (or their sponsors),
the competition for votes will drive candidates to adopt the policy associated with the
median voter: any other policy platform will lose. In this simple text-book model, political
contributions could have no real impact, so there is little prospect for an argument for their
regulation.  The real puzzle in such a model is why campaign contributions would ever be
made at all.
Of course, once we depart from the simplest model, campaign contributions can have a real
effect in influencing outcomes - so that there may be some grounds for regulating campaign
contributions in some way. However, the nature of the role campaign contributions play,
and therefore the nature of any argument for regulating such donations will depend on the
precise nature of the departure from the simplest model of electoral competition. It is at
least possible that the role played by campaign contribution actually improves political
outcome - so that rather than ‘perverting’ the political process, campaign contributions
may form a valuable part of that process.  One such possibility is explored by Rietz et al
(1998)11. The basic idea in that paper is that making a campaign contribution is a costly
and therefore credible way of signalling support for one or other candidate; and that such
signals may provide valuable information to other voters in determining their voting
behaviour. Campaign contributions, in this sense, allow citizens to ‘put their money where
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their mouth is’ and so escape the problem that political argument might be dismissed as
‘cheap talk’. Other models are, of course, possible. Our point is not that this or that model
is appropriate, but rather the more fundamental point that campaign contributions could
conceivably have some positive role to play, so that it is not appropriate to assume that
any impact on political outcomes is evidence of corruption.
Part of the difficulty in evaluating Ayres’s case for secrecy is that he tends to cast the
definition of ‘corruption’ pretty broadly. Following Cass Sunstein’s insistence on a clear
demarcation between “market processes of purchase and sale on the one hand, and
political processes of voting and reason-giving on the other” (as quoted in Ayres, pxx),
Ayres seems disposed to consider any element of political exchange (as, for example, in
logrolling) and/or the intrusion of any element of private-interest, as opposed to more
conventionally political/ideological reasons for political support, as an instance of
‘corruption’. Such a broad definition fails to distinguish between practices that almost
everyone would regard as depraved - such as direct clandestine payments of cash to a
political decision-maker in return for determination of policy in the donor’s favour -- and
practices that many might feel are, if not entirely admirable, at least fall well short of the
worst that can be imagined. Using invitations to a White House dinner as a means of raising
funds for the Democratic party may be decidedly tacky and less than one ought to expect
from one’s President, but it is not on a par with giving huge defence contracts to the tender
offering the largest cash bribe.  In other words, if we are to model all transfers between
political representatives/candidates and external agents in quid pro quo terms, we need to
be reasonably precise about the nature of both the quid and the quo in that transaction if an
appropriately nuanced evaluation of such transfers is to be secured. And this would be so
even if minimization of corruption were the only normatively relevant game in town. If
some quid pro quo arrangements are much more objectionable than others, we have to be
careful that we do not regulate the less objectionable forms out of existence at the cost of
encouraging more objectionable forms. We should be careful about outlawing a practice that
is merely dubious or whose effects we only suspect, if doing so risks increasing a practice
that may be much more objectionable.
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To focus the discussion here a little, consider a matrix of possibilities. To simplify, we
consider just two categories of quid (rows) and three of quo (columns). Consider the quo
dimension first. At one extreme, we can conceive of direct policy determination by the
‘donor’: policy-making is effectively up for auction to the highest bidder. At a more
modest level, the donor may acquire policy influence - perhaps by means of privileged
access, the opportunity to offer comment, relevant information and/or advice. In this case,
there may not even be any particular presumption of sympathy on the political agent’s
part: the candidate/politician simply makes herself available to hear the argument the donor
seeks to make. It may even be that any such argument will itself have to pass a general
‘public interest’ test if it is to be ultimately effective. Presumably, the donor believes that
this privileged access will lead to policy influence in at least some cases but, from the
normative perspective, it is by no means obvious that this policy influence is necessarily a
bad thing.  The access that the contribution makes possible simply serves to secure the
public interest ( though admittedly only in that subset of cases in which the public interest
and the donor’s private interest happen to coincide). The third and final type of quo that
may be relevant arises when the benefit to donors takes the form of ‘incidental services’ of
the kind that political agents routinely provide for constituents - from assistance in getting
visas, to the rental of the White House dining room for one’s daughter’s wedding, to the
simple prestige of being seen (and photographed) with prominent politicians or the
acquisition of a knighthood. Much of the practice here may be rather tacky and some of
that practice may, in the long run, be corrosive of the esteem in which public office is held,
but it is not obviously deeply sinister and may not have any effect on policy at all – even
of the most indirect kind.
In order to assess how anxious about campaign contribution regulation we ought to be, we
would need to know just where in this spectrum of these possibilities, actual practice lies.
On this question, Ayres neither offers evidence himself nor refers to relevant literature. We
simply don’t know how much influence on actual policy determination a million dollars of
campaign contribution buys: nor do we know what other factors are relevant in affecting
that degree of influence. Rather, we are left to induce from the fact of the contributions that
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the donors must see themselves as getting their money’s worth; and we are asked to base
our suspicions accordingly.
A Matrix of Possibilities
Quo
Policy
Auction
Privileged
Access
Incidental
Services
     Quid Cash 1 2 3
Campaign
Support
4 5 6
It is worth stressing that there is at least one kind of quo within the range labelled
‘privileged access’, where donor anonymity will not be effective in reducing campaign
contributions or their impact on policy. Suppose that candidate C chooses her policy
platform in order to maximise the probability of her election - and that this involves being
sensitive to the fund-raising potential of different policies. Suppose also that potential
donor D makes a contribution to candidate C’s campaign funds if C’s policies are in D’s
interests. Here, D is effectively ‘buying’ an increased probability of C’s victory, and C is
‘selling’ policies to attract potential donors. But C’s awareness of D’s identity is
immaterial for the rationality of D’s decision to donate, and may be equally immaterial for
C’s decision as to which policy to espouse. Even in the presence of full anonymity, C can
be aware that espousing certain kinds of policies - ones that give a substantial benefit to
particular salient interests, perhaps - is conducive to larger campaign contributions, and can
tailor her policy platform accordingly. We might say that the political trade or contract
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between candidate and donors is implicit rather than explicit, yet the same effects on
policy platforms arise in this case as might arise under full disclosure. Indeed, because such
implicit transactions are not publicly accessible, there may not be the same general mistrust
of such contributions, or any real possibility of electoral backlash over such implicit
political exchanges.  But  whether anonymity here supports such forms of ‘corruption’ or
not, there does seem to be the potential for a form of corruption that is immune from
Ayres’s proposed cure.  Ayres would doubtless, and correctly, point to the free-rider
aspects of any potential donor’s decision problem if the benefits of C’s election are spread
across many people. But this argument does not depend on the distinction between
anonymity and disclosure. The free rider problem may arise, and arise equally, whether
anonymity applies or not; so that the shift from a norm of disclosure to a norm of
anonymity might have no significant effect at all. Indeed, if disclosure helps to solve free-
rider problems among teams of donors, then anonymity will simply serve to discriminate
in favour of the most concentrated interests.
Consider now the quid side of the transaction - the rows in our matrix of possibilities. The
spirit of Ayres’s discussion and much other treatment of campaign contributions is that
the precise form of campaign contributions is largely irrelevant. This conclusion arises
from the fact that candidates are modelled as a homogeneous set of simple utility
maximisers for whom money income and the benefits from holding office are fully
substitutable in the utility function. From the candidate’s point of view, campaign
contributions, of whatever form, are a close substitute for cash payments. Or so the
argument goes. We would argue, however, that the form or ‘currency’ in which benefits are
received is far from insignificant. To see this, suppose that different candidates differ in
their motivational structure - with some displaying more venal motivations, and some
displaying  more ‘public-interestedness’. Consider a comparison between two extremes. In
one case a cash payment of $10,000 is offered that might be appropriated as income by the
candidate; in the other case, the offer is made in terms of campaign support services -
printing pamphlets, paying for TV time or whatever - valued at $10,000. This second form
of reward is such that it will be more attractive, ceteris paribus, to the relatively virtuous
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candidate – the one who values office highly  relative to cash. The preference for office
may reflect a value  for office for its own sake, or because office provides an opportunity
to ‘do good’, or because of the public esteem that office offers. In all cases, the candidate
who looks to politics as a way of making money will be screened out in favour of those
candidates with other motivations. And for those who distrust the venal in politics, this
must surely be an attractive feature.
In overview, then, our matrix of possibilities identifies six cases ranging from one extreme
(case 1) in which cash bribes are rewarded by the direct determination of policy, to the
opposite extreme (case 6) in which in-kind campaign support is exchanged for incidental
benefits such as enhanced prestige. And we have suggested that in five of these six cases
there may be some genuine claim that the practise has at least some merit. Only in case 1
does the normative argument seem clearly to indicate a genuine corruption of the political
process. Of course, the mere enumeration of six cases does not imply that they are of equal
importance, and it might be that case 1 is the overwhelmingly relevant case. But we doubt
it. We think that the apparent salience of case 1 is more a product of the narrow
interpretation of the rational choice approach to politics.    
And there is the further consideration that larger campaign contributions may themselves
be conducive to a more vibrant, engaged and informed electorate. In a context where
individuals may have rather weak incentives to inform themselves about either the
attributes of candidates or the policies those candidates endorse, campaign contributions
may perform the important function of ensuring that political messages are packaged in a
way that voters will find accessible and attractive to attend to. After all, if campaign
expenditures influence the probability of being elected at all, they must influence
(potential) voters in some way - either in persuading them to alter their votes or to exercise
their votes. Much political advertising might strike academic commentators as rather
uninformative or less than ideally ‘discursive’, but it is difficult to see how one could
coherently be contemptuous of political advertising without being at least somewhat
contemptuous of the electorate’s capacity to be influenced by such advertising, and hence
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of the whole process of popular democracy. If on the other hand, one thought that
campaign expenditures do some positive work in informing the public, then there is a cost
to any proposal that seeks to reduce such expenditures - a cost that ought to be factored
into any proper normative calculus. American practice has happened to hit upon a quasi-
voluntary mechanism for meeting the considerable cost of providing relevant political
information to voters, and of doing so in a way that provides incentives  to make this
information attractive and accessible to voters. This mechanism may not be ideal; it may
involve some effect on policy platforms that draws those platforms away from those that
a  full application of the public interest norm would require. Even then, however, that cost
may be one that it is reasonable to pay. And that is more likely to be one’s conclusion if
one believes that voter ignorance and voter apathy are significant problems.
V.  Practicalities
Finally, we turn to some of the practical details that may be relevant to any choice
between disclosure and anonymity. Ayres argues that a system of full anonymity is
practicable and goes into some detail as to how such a regime might be organised. At the
same time, it is clear that most discussion of the reform of political funding takes the
opposite view. In the UK context, for example, the recent enquiry into the funding of
political parties12 dismisses the use of blind trusts (which have been used and advocated
by the Labour Party prior to this enquiry) or other mechanisms attempting to
institutionalise anonymity. It might be that this dismissal depends on other institutional
differences between the UK and the US. For example, almost all political donations in the
UK are made to political parties rather than to individual candidates; corporate donations
are both legal and commonplace in the UK; and so on. It is easy to see that differences of
this type will matter. If corporate donations are allowed, for example, one might easily
accept that shareholders have a right to decide (or at least monitor) such contributions and
such monitoring requires at least some degree of openness.
A further practical doubt concerns the viability of the contributions-booth approach
proposed by Ayres. The issue is this - if anyone knows the identity of donors (and the
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size of their donations), there will be considerable pressure in the system (from the press,
as well as from politicians and donors themselves) for that information to leak out. Those
charged with operating the contributions-booth will bear the brunt of this pressure. And
however they behave, there will always be the suspicion that some information does leak,
not least since it would be impossible to prove the absence of a leak. Of course, one might
refine the proposal still further so that all contributions had to be made in cash or other
untraceable form so that literally no one other than the donor has information on identity.
But this highlights another problem. Put crudely, what prevents the operators of the
contributions-booth from simply taking the money rather than passing it on to the
candidate or party that it was intended for? If all political agents are to be modelled in the
rational choice tradition as venal utility maximisers, the contributions-booth operators
must also be modelled in this way, and anything that prevents information on donors and
donations becoming public also prevents any monitoring or auditing of their operation.
These two practical problems seem to cross-cut in a way that seriously undermines the
possibility of an anonymous system. True anonymity would result in no donations
reaching their intended target and, recognising this, donors would be unwilling to make
donations and  the resultant equilibrium would be the degenerate one in which no donations
are made. But then the question of how to finance politics has been avoided rather than
answered.  
It is worth noting, too, that Ayres sees the chief virtue of his scheme to be that of reducing
the number of large-scale contributors. The campaign arena may, however, be one in which
there is some safety in numbers: a situation in which there are a hundred notable givers may
be more desirable than a situation in which there are only a handful, even if there is some
doubt as to who that handful are. It is surprising, moreover, in the US context, that Ayres
does not give more attention to the problem of extremely rich individuals buying political
influence by standing for office themselves (or through members of their families) and
using their personal wealth to finance campaigns in a way that other less well-off
candidates could never match in the absence of campaign support from external sources.
And, of course, there is the familiar point that reduced campaign expenditures would
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differentially favour incumbents, because incumbents derive name recognition and general
salience via the free mechanisms of ordinary media coverage.  
VI. Finale
Ayres’s proposal of an institutional regime of anonymity in relation to campaign
contributions seems to us to be interesting but ultimately unpersuasive. The proposal is
interesting because it challenges an orthodox belief in openness  - a belief that is held more
as an article of faith than as the result of clear analysis of the alternatives. All too often in
institutional discussion, the onus of proof is decisive and that onus is itself decided by
familiarity. Ayres does a positive service by opening up for consideration a possibility
that mere familiarity effectively closes off. Ayres’s appeal to the analogy with the secret
ballot is rhetorically powerful in this connection precisely because he is able to mobilise a
no less common prejudice in favour of secrecy. But this analogy may serve no less to raise
reasonable doubts about the secrecy of voting as to encourage secrecy in the campaign
contribution case. In any event, the analogy is far from perfect: as we see it, the secret
ballot encourages ‘privacy’ in  the voting case; in the campaign contribution case, donor
anonymity encourages deception
 But our judgment of Ayres’s argument does not depend on the strength or otherwise of
any analogy. In our view, Ayres’s discussion is unpersuasive because his arguments are
insufficiently general. In particular, there is too little attention to the specification of the
democratic context within which his recommendations are to have effect. To be sure, there
is a limit on what one can reasonably expect of an author in a single paper. But, as we have
tried to show, Ayres’s case for anonymity depends on a whole range of matters, including
among others: whether politics is best characterised by universal distrust, so that only
verifiable claims are believed or on partial trust where non-verifiable claims have at least
some credibility; on what exactly the motives for giving campaign contributions are; on
how broadly one understands ‘corruption’ and whether the minimisation of corruption,
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however exactly understood, is the appropriate single objective for the design of political
institutions; and on what it is exactly that people do when they vote and therefore on the
authority of the vox populi in various contexts. These are all large questions and, we think,
unsettled ones. To say that they should all be settled before the Ayres scheme can be
properly evaluated is undoubtedly a counsel of despair. But when those questions are
treated in the most plausible first-cut way, the balance of considerations does not appear
to favour the regulatory regime that Ayres proposes.
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Notes
1 In some cases the distinction between a corrupt bribe and a legitimate payment may
hinge upon whether the action or service purchased is illegal, or on whether the intention is
fraudulent (i.e. based on some deception). But if the action/service purchased is legal, and
there is no deception, the difference between a corrupt bribe and a legitimate payment is
by no means obvious
2 Clearly, we do not wish to imply that there are only two approaches to questions of
institutional design. Each of the two styles we identify is capable of supporting a wide
variety of approaches. For discussion of approaches to institutional design see Goodin, R.
(ed.) (1996), The Theory of Institutional Design, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
which also provides excellent references to the related literature. Brennan, G. and Hamlin,
A. (1999), Democratic Devices and Desires, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
attempts both to iterate between the styles identified here and to develop a particular
approach.
3 Ayres, I. (1999) Disclosure v. Anonymity in Campaign Finance, NOMOS, (manuscript
pages 14 - 16).
4 For an overview of the deliberative democracy literature, and relevant references, see
Bohman, J. (1998) The Coming of Age of Deliberative Democracy, The Journal of Political
Philosophy, 6, 400-425.
5 Of course, there are other models of democracy offering further diagnoses and cures. We
concentrate on the two identified models for clarity and because they seem to us to be
particularly relevant.
6 Our views are laid out and defended much more fully in Brennan, G. and Hamlin, A.
(1999), Democratic Devices and Desires, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
although the institutional structures discussed in detail do not include campaign financing.
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7 For detailed discussion see Brennan, G. and Lomasky, L. (1993) Democracy and
Decision, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, and Brennan, G. and Hamlin, A. (1998)
Expressive Voting and Electoral Equilibrium, Public Choice, 95, 149-175.
8 For more detailed discussion of a proposal to render voting public see Brennan, G. and
Pettit, P. (1990), Unveiling the Vote, British Journal of Political Science, 20, 311-333, and
references therein. 
9 Of course, this is not an essential part of an expressive account, since self-expression
may be sufficient.
10  For a discussion of trust see Brennan, G. and Hamlin, A. (1999), Democratic Devices
and Desires, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, chapter 3 and references therein,
especially Hollis, M. (1998) Trust within Reason, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
11 Reitz, T., Myerson, R. and Weber, R. (1998) Campaign Finance Levels as Coordinating
Signals in Three-Way, Experimental Elections, Economics and Politics, 10, 185-218.
12 The Funding of Political Parties in the United Kingdom, (1998) (Fifth Report of the
Committee on Standards in Public Life - Chairman Lord Neill) London: HMSO.
